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Introduction
Trading in exchange-listed securities, such as stocks and their options, is extremely active. In 2000, the average daily trading volume in the NYSE reached 1.04 billion shares for 43.9 billion US dollars. Trading volume in options is also huge. "Options trading is now the world's biggest business, with an estimated daily turnover of over 2.5 trillion US dollars and an annual growth rate of around 14%".
1 Given such a high trading volume, the following question arises naturally: What drives investors' trading in the securities market and the associated options market? Portfolio rebalancing, due to heterogeneity in preferences, endowments, and liquidity needs, has been used to explain trading volume in financial markets, but Ross (1989) argues that "It is difficult to imagine that the volume of trade in security markets has very much to do with the modest amount of trading required to accomplish the continual and gradual portfolio balancing inherent in our current intertemporal models.
It seems clear that the only way to explain the volume of trade is with a model that is at one and the same time appealingly rational and yet permits divergent and changing opinions in a fashion that is other than ad hoc."
This paper analyzes trading volume arising from investors' differences of opinion regarding public information and their perceived value added from frequent trading. Moreover, we analyze how options trading reacts to public information, the perceived value of options trading, and the effects of options introduction on the trading volume of the underlying stock. In our model, investors have heterogeneous beliefs even when they observe the same public signal. In the presence of options, investors trade to a Pareto optimal allocation in all periods, and they will trade again with the arrival of new public information. The Milgrom-Stokey (1982) no-trade theorem does not apply as investors interpret public information differently from one another, and consequently, the beliefs about public signals do not satisfy the essentially concordance condition.
More specifically, in our model, investors have CARA utility and believe that the stock payoff distribution is normal. After the first round of trade, there are new public signals 1 From Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of Options by Edward Swan (2000) .
about the final stock payoff arriving at the market. Investors have the opportunity to trade again in the market. If investors start with homogeneous beliefs, then they achieve Pareto optimal allocation after the first round of trade. When new public signals arrive, however, they create differences of opinion across investors because investors interpret them differently. Investors disagree on the quality of signals. Suppose the signal is very positive, then all investors will revise their expectations upward. However, how much investors update depends on the ratio of their prior precision (before observing the public signal) and their beliefs about the precision of the public signal. We call this ratio the investor's updating ratio. In equilibrium, an investor's net trading is proportional to the difference between his updating ratio and that of the average investor. Investors who overweigh the precision of the public signal act as trend chasers, whereas those who underweigh the precision of the public signal act as contrarians. We find that an investor's perceived value of additional rounds of trading is always positive and increases with the absolute value of the difference between his perceived precision of the public signal and the average perceived precision of all investors.
We also find that the trading volume of the underlying stock is proportional to the changes in its price. In other words, in the absence of options, trading occurs only when the stock price changes. Moreover, if investors disagree on a public signal once, they will continue to trade even if they agree on public signals in all future periods.
When options are introduced, we show that investors who have higher perceived conditional volatility about the stock payoff take long positions in options to synthesize convex payoffs, whereas investors who have lower perceived conditional volatility short options to achieve concave payoffs. 2 We further show that differences of opinion affect trades for the underlying stock as well as for options and that the trading volume of the stock depends not only on its price changes but also on the option prices. Both multiple trading and trading in options increase investors' perceived expected utility. The gains from trading in options are greater than those from trading in the underlying stock. Contrary to other models with dynamic trading [e.g., Brennan and Cao (1996) ], the gains of trading in options in our model cannot be approximated by frequent trading.
Interestingly, the introduction of certain options can make the market complete. Consequently, we show that the prices of all option claims on the underlying stock satisfy the "risk-neutral" pricing property of the Black and Scholes (1973) model. Thus prices of all assets are determined using a market consensus conditional volatility of the stock payoff, as if there existed a representative investor. Yet trading occurs in every period as investors interpret new public signals differently in every period.
Our model has the following empirical implications. First, trading volumes in options should be higher around the dates of public events, such as earnings announcements, mergers and acquisitions, and bond rating changes, because public information generates differences of opinion, which drive options trading. Second, when there are more differences of opinion about a stock's payoff, trading volumes in both the stock and its options should be higher because investors' demands on options depend on their beliefs about the volatility of the stock payoff. This paper is most closely related to Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) , both of which use differences of opinion to generate trades for a stock in the absence of options. 4 They show that with two types of investors, differences of opinion can generate trading patterns consistent with stylized empirical evidence. In particular, Harris and Raviv show that trading volume is positive when there is a change in stock prices, whereas Kandel and Pearson show that trading can occur even when stock prices remain the same. The main difference between our work and these studies is that we focus on the trading volume of options and on the effects of options on the trading volume of the underlying stock, whereas they consider only the relationship between the trading volume and the price change of the stock. Moreover, we analyze the value of both additional trading sessions and options and show that the gains from options trading cannot be approximated by frequent trading in the underlying stock. Our model also makes different predictions regarding the trading volume 3 One proxy for differences of opinion is the dispersion of beliefs among financial analysts. It would be informative to determine whether trading volume in options is higher for stocks with more dispersion in financial analysts' forecasts.
4 See also Varian (1989) and Odean (1998 Other studies that employ differences of opinion to generate trades include Harrison and Kreps (1978) , DeTemple and Murphy (1994) , Kraus and Smith (1996) , Morris (1996) , Basak (2000) , Zapatero (1998) , Duffie, Garleanu, and Pederson (2002) , Kyle and Lin (2002) , Buraschi and Jiltsov (2003) , David (2003) , Hong and Stein (2003) , Qu, Starks, and Yan (2003) , and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003 Kraus and Smith present situations in which trading in options can affect the price process of the underlying asset in a two-period setting. Buraschi and Jiltsov construct an equilibrium in the presence of an option with two types of investors.
5 Although their theoretical model does not offer specific empirical predictions, they find empirically that an increase in their index of difference in beliefs leads to an increase in option open interest.
In short, the previous theoretical models on differences of opinion have not established specific relations both between trading volumes in options and differences of opinion and between the introduction of options and trading volumes in the underlying stock. Moreover, those models have not discussed the welfare implications of introducing options.
Our paper is also related to studies that employ noise traders/random endowments and asymmetric information to generate trades. These include Pfleiderer (1984) , Kyle (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Brown and Jennings (1989) , Grundy and McNichols (1989) , Kim and Verrecchia (1991) , Holden and Subrahmanayam (1992) , Back (1993) , Foster and 5 For another model in which options are not redundant assets, see, for example, Liu and Pan (2003) .
Viswanathan (1993), Shalen (1993) , Biais and Hillion (1994) , Wang (1994) , He and Wang (1995) , Brennan and Cao (1996) , and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) . In particular, Brennan and Cao consider an equilibrium model in the presence of options. They focus on the impact of introducing options on investors' welfare rather than on trading volume in the options market. They show that with the introduction of an appropriate option security, Pareto efficiency can be achieved in only a single round of trading, 6 and, as a result, investors will no longer trade in either the underlying stock or the option security in future rounds.
To generate additional trading with the arrival of new public information, Brennan and Cao and all other works under asymmetric information rely on the introduction of additional noise/liquidity trading. A problem with this approach is that the argument to explain the trading volume is circular-it essentially requires new exogenous supply shocks to the stock to generate trading volume. In this sense, trading is imposed onto the economy rather than endogenously generated. For example, to generate trading around the earnings announcement dates, these studies need noise traders for the equilibrium to be partially revealing. However, Kandel and Pearson (1995) find no evidence that noise trading is particularly high around earnings announcements, and Pan and Poteshman (2003) find no asymmetrically informed trading in the index options market. On the other hand, trading in our model is driven endogenously by differential interpretation of public signals without the need to introduce exogenous noise traders.
Models using the asymmetric information paradigm also make very different testable predictions regarding the interaction between options and the underlying stock. For example, in the absence of additional noise trading, Brennan and Cao (1996) predict that the introduction of options reduces the trading volume of the underlying stock to zero and there will be no trading volume in options with the arrival of new public information in future periods. 7 On the contrary, our model predicts that trading volumes in both the underlying stock and its options should be higher around the dates of public announcements in time series as well as cross sectional studies, and are positively related to the degrees of disper-6 Back (1993), Biais and Hillion (1994), and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) also analyze the effects of options when information is asymmetric. DeTemple and Selden (1991) analyze the effects of options under symmetric information.
7 These predictions are not supported by empirical evidence. See, for example, Cao (1999) for a discussion of stylized empirical results regarding the impact of options introduction on the trading volume of the underlying stock. sion of beliefs among investors. Moreover, our model predicts that options trading makes the trading volumes of the underlying stocks both higher and more sensitive to stock price changes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the benchmark case in the absence of options. Section 3 develops the full model of trading with options. Section 4 concludes the paper. The appendix contains the proofs.
Differences of Opinion and Trading in the Stock
In this section we consider trading in the stock due to differences of opinion in the absence 
where τ represents the risk tolerance of investors.
As an introduction, we first consider the basic single-period model.
A Static One-Period Model
Let P 0 be the price of the stock and D i 0 be the demand of investor i for the stock. Investor i's time 1 wealth is given by
It is well known that in this setting [Sharpe (1964) ] a linear equilibrium exists in which
Equation (1) expresses the equilibrium price as the expected payoff less a risk premium that depends on the per capita stock supply x. We assume that the values ofū, x, τ , and h are such that P 0 is positive.
The expected utility of investor i conditional on his endowment but before receipt of the public signal is given by
Investor i's wealth at time 1, W i , is a linear function of the stock payoff u and may be written as
The marginal rate of substitution for investor i between wealth contingent on u = u l and u = u k is given by
Because the marginal rate of substitution is the same for all investors, this equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
A Dynamic Model
In this subsection we extend the single-period model to allow for additional market sessions between time 0 and time 1, at which point the stock payoff is realized and consumption occurs. Immediately before each market session, a public signal about the stock payoff arrives. Note that the one-period equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. According to Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , there should be no more trading after the first round when new information about the final stock payoff becomes publicly available. However, the Milgrom and Stokey theorem holds only when investors have essentially concordant beliefs about the public information. When investors' beliefs are not essentially concordant, trading among investors can occur with the arrival of public information. See, for example, Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) .
Equilibrium Price and Demands
Specifically, consider a setting in which information about the final payoff u is made available gradually by a series of public signals y t = u + η t at time τ t = t/T, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, where η t is independently and normally distributed. Although all investors believe that η t has a mean 0, they disagree on the precision of η t . In particular, investor i believes that η t has a mean zero and a precision n i t . Let n t ≡ 1 0 n i t denote the average precision of the public signal. In this paper, we define the concepts of high confidence and low confidence as follows.
t > 1, we define that investor i has high confidence about the public signal at time t. When ρ i t < 1, we define that investor i has low confidence about the public signal at time t.
After each signal the market opens for trading, and at time 1, the payoff of the stock is realized and consumption occurs. Let P t denote the price of the stock at time τ t . Trader i's optimal demand for the stock at time τ t is denoted by D i t . A dynamic equilibrium is described in the following theorem. Its proof and all other proofs are given in the appendix.
Theorem 1 In an economy with T trading sessions, there exists a dynamic equilibrium in which prices, and demands for the stock, are given by
where
n i j , and
Here µ t and µ i t denote the conditional expectations for the average investor and investor i at time τ t , respectively. K i t denotes the conditional precision for investor i and K t denotes the average precision of all investors.
Because investor i is risk averse, his demand for the risky stock increases with his precision about the signal as well as his conditional mean of the final payoff, as in a typical meanvariance framework. An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that the price depends on the average investor's conditional mean and conditional precision of the stock payoff. The average investor does not buy or sell in equilibrium and serves as the marginal investor. We next examine the conditions under which trading takes place in equilibrium.
Equilibrium Dynamic Trading
Let ∆P t ≡ P t − P t−1 denote the price change in trading session t. In equilibrium, equation (7) yields
When
= 0, investor i will trade at trading session t if the stock price changes. We discuss two sufficient conditions that generate trades among investors. In the first case,
Investors agree on how to interpret information prior to trading session t but disagree at trading session t.
The Milgrom-Stokey (1982) theorem no longer holds due to differential interpretation of the public signal at trading session t. In the second case,
. Investors agree on how to interpret information at trading session t but disagree on prior interpretations. In this case, the Milgrom-Stokey theorem again fails because investors' allocation is no longer Pareto optimal, conditional on investors' holdings at trading session (t − 1). This can be shown by examining the marginal rate of substitution after trading session (t − 1). The marginal rate of substitution for investor i between wealth contingent on stock payoffs u = u l and u = u k is given by
Because the marginal rate of substitution is investor specific through K Proposition 1 If investors disagree on the public signal for only one period and agree on the signals before and after that period, then they will continue trading after that period, but the equilibrium allocation will not be Pareto optimal.
This proposition indicates that to generate trading, investors need to disagree on the public signals only once. Thereafter, they will trade even if they agree on all new public signals in future periods.
Proposition 1 differs from the result of Harris and Raviv (1993) , who show that trade occurs only when investors disagree on the public signal in that period. Our model does not require investors to disagree in every period to generate trading. This difference arises from the fact that they assume that investors are risk neutral and that there are short sale constraints, whereas we assume that investors are risk averse and that there are no portfolio constraints.
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We next apply the results of Theorem 1 to calculate the perceived expected utility gains from the increased trading opportunities.
Perceived Value of Dynamic Trading
In the following lemma, investor i's expected utility conditional on his endowment but before observing the public signals, EU i (T ), is expressed as a function of his individual and the market average precisions in each of the T trading sessions.
Lemma 1
where EU i (1) is the expected utility of investor i in a one-period economy in which investors can trade only once at time 0.
An investor's expected utility in our model can be expressed as the product of the expected utility without any future trade and a term that corresponds to the utility gain from future trading opportunities. This permits a simple calculation of the monetary value of trading opportunities. Define γ i (T ) as the difference (for investor i) between the certainty equivalent wealth of T market sessions and that of one market session, that is,
The certainty equivalent gain, γ i (T ), is the maximum amount that investor i would be willing to pay to have T trading sessions rather than simply one trading session at time 0.
Comparing the expression for the expected utility in the single-session economy in Subsection 2.1 with that for the T session economy in Lemma 1, we obtain that γ i (T ) is given by
Expression (11) implies that the gain from additional market sessions is positive for all investors except for those whose precision for the public signal is equal to the average precision. Contrary to the no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , almost all investors trade in this economy and the expected utility of those investors increases with the number of additional trading sessions. The magnitude of the utility gains depends on the rate at which the individual and the market average posterior precisions, K t and K i t , change between market sessions, as well as the time pattern of the public signal precisions, n t and n i t . Expression (11) also indicates that market closures always lower investors' perceived gains from trading. Thus, our model may help explain why continuous trading throughout the day becomes almost ubiquitous in current financial markets. The following corollary arises naturally from equation (11).
Corollary 1 Adding additional trading sessions makes all investors better off.
Expression (11) is quite complex. To simplify the exposition, we assume in the rest of the paper that the updating ratio ρ
We next discuss the limiting behavior of the gains from trade as the number of trading sessions goes to infinity. One would have thought that with infinite trading sessions, the perceived gains from trade will go to infinity. We show here that this is not the case. As the number of trading sessions goes to infinity, the trading gains converge to a finite value. Let
represents the change in conditional volatility of the average investor. Assuming that ∆(1/K t )/(1/T ) is bounded from above, we have
which shows that investor i's certainty equivalent gain is a function of the ratio between his perceived precision and that of the average investor, who has the average precision n t . There is no trading and thus no gains for the average investor. Equation (12) implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2 As the number of trading sessions goes to infinity, investor i's trading gains converge to a finite value. The certainty equivalent gain in the limit is a function of the updating ratio ρ i , as given in equation (12), and is zero when the investor has the average precision ρ i = 1.
We next apply Theorem 1 to study the stock price dynamics and trading strategies of investors.
Trend-Chasing, Contrarian Strategies and Price Dynamics
To characterize investors' trading strategies we consider the change in investor i's demand for the stock between successive market sessions. Using equations (6) and (7), we have
It is clear that trading occurs as investors disagree on how to interpret public information as (ii) The trades of investors with low confidence (ρ i < 1) at time τ t are negatively correlated with the price change at time τ t .
(iii) Investors with the average confidence level (ρ i = 1) do not trade.
This proposition states that investors with high confidence adopt trend-chasing strategies, whereas investors with low confidence adopt contrarian strategies. It also implies that depending on their confidence levels, investors may have different expectations about future stock prices conditional on the current stock price. When the current stock price is low due to bad news, investors with low confidence believe that investors on average had overreacted to the bad news, so the stock price will rebound in the next period. On the other hand, investors with high confidence believe that the investors with low confidence had underreacted to the bad news, so the stock price will go down even further in the next period. The next proposition summarizes the price dynamics based on different investors' perspectives.
Proposition 3 (i) For an investor with high confidence (ρ i > 1), the price change at time τ t+1 is positively correlated with the price at time τ t and is positively correlated with the price change at time τ t , that is,
Cov
(ii) For an investor with low confidence (ρ i < 1), the price change at time τ t+1 is negatively correlated with the price at time τ t and is negatively correlated with the price change at time τ t , that is,
(iii) For the average investor (ρ i = 1), the price change at time τ t+1 is uncorrelated with the price at time τ t and is uncorrelated with the price change at time τ t , that is,
We next apply Theorem 1 to study the equilibrium trading volume of the stock.
Trading Volume
Many empirical studies have examined the contemporaneous behavior of volume and absolute price changes and found a positive correlation between the two [e.g., Karpoff (1987) ]. Since the dynamics of price volatility and trading volume can only be studied in a multiple trading session economy, in this subsection we present additional results on the autocorrelation properties of trading volume as well as the relation between trading volume and the number of trading sessions between time 0 and time 1.
Let ∆P t = P t − P t−1 denote the price change at time τ t , where t = 1, . . ., T − 1. Let trading volume at time τ t , V t , be defined as one half the sum of all purchases and sales, that is,
Note that there is no hedging demand for the stock in our model and that all trades are due to the differences of opinion about public signals. As a result, we obtain a simple result that the trading volume in each period is proportional to the product of the absolute price change and the dispersion of investors' public information precisions. In Proposition 2, we have shown that price changes are serially correlated if the true precision is different from the average precision. Since the correlation coefficient between the absolute values of two normally distributed variables x and y with correlation r(x, y) and means of zero is given by Corr(|x|, |y|) = 2 π − 2 r(x,y) 0 arcsin tdt > 0, the following lemma is immediate.
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Lemma 2 (i) Trading volume and absolute price changes are positively correlated.
(ii) Trading volume and absolute change of the precision weighted average forecast are positively correlated.
(iii) Trading volume is higher when the public signal is very informative (a high value of n t ).
(iv) Trading volume increases with the dispersion of beliefs among investors.
(v) For any investor whose precision is different from the average precision, the absolute price change and trading volume are positively serially correlated.
The first three implications are consistent with the empirical evidence summarized in Karpoff (1987) . Implication (iv) implies that trading volume may be related to the dispersion among financial analysts' forecasts. Empirically, Frankel and Froot (1990) examine foreign exchange data and find a positive relation between volume and dispersion, and Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) also obtain a positive relation between stock volume of trading and the dispersion in financial analysts' earnings forecasts, both of which seem to support our prediction (iv). Implication (v) may be tested using survey data of investors' beliefs about the stock price changes.
We next show that the expected volume of trade can be substantial as the number of trading sessions goes to infinity. The total volume of trade in an economy with T trading sessions, V (T ), is given by
Notice that
The expected volume at time τ t , E i [V t ], is obtained from (6) using a property of the normal distribution:
where V (µ, σ) is the expected absolute value of a normally distributed variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 , and where
with n(·) and N (·) representing the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable, respectively. It is straightforward to show that
is an increasing function of µ and σ when µ and σ are positive. As a result, the expected volume at time τ t is increasing in the precision of the public signal, n t , and decreasing in the prior average precision, K t−1 .
Notice that 1/K t represents the conditional variance of the average investor at time τ t .
Let
Here the variable s(τ t ) represents the rate of change of variance at trading session t and is assumed to be bounded from above. Using equations (20) and (21), we get:
Lemma 3 When T is large, the expected trading volume is proportional to the square root of T , that is,
where Q ≡ 1 2 τ |ρ i − 1|di measures the dispersion of beliefs among investors.
This lemma implies that differences of opinion among investors can give rise to an unlimited amount of trading volume as the number of market sessions increases without limit. Intuitively, trading takes place in every period due to investors' differences of opinion of public signals.
We next introduce options into the economy and study the effects of options on various equilibrium properties.
Effects of Options

Equilibrium Prices and Demands
The financial market is incomplete with one stock and one risk-free asset. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) have shown that the market can be completed by the introduction of a complete set of options. We complete the market by introducing all call options with positive strike prices and all put options with negative strike prices. All options are in zero net supply.
Any derivative asset with a twice differentiable price function f (u) can be synthesized using a collection of options:
where Z denotes the strike prices. The next theorem establishes that there exists an equilibrium with options and describes the demand and prices for both stock and options.
Theorem 2 Let P CZt denote the price of a call option with strike price Z in trading session
CZt denote investor i's demand density of options at strike price Z, that is, the holdings of call options with strike price Z to Z + dZ is given by D i CZt dZ. Define the price and demand for the put options similarly as P P Zt and D i P Zt . Then there exists a dynamic equilibrium in which
Theorem 2 shows that the options are not redundant securities. In this equilibrium, investors with high confidence (ρ i > 1) take short positions in the options while investors with low confidence (ρ i < 1) take long positions in the options. 10 Intuitively, investors with high confidence perceive a lower volatility for the stock, so they believe that options
CZt is determined by the sign of (1 − ρ i ).
are overvalued. As a result, they take short positions on options. Similarly, investors with low confidence perceive options to be undervalued, so they take long positions. Although investors achieve the Pareto optimal allocation, those whose precision about the public signal is different from that of the average investor will trade in the options in every period. In the presence of options, investors will trade in the underlying stock to hedge option positions even if the price of the underlying stock does not change. Indeed, as to be studied in subsection 3.4, the trading volume of the underlying stock is positive even if the stock price remains unchanged.
With normal stock payoff distribution and CARA utility, the Pareto efficient allocation is a quadratic function of the final payoff of the stock u. In equilibrium, investors use options to synthesize the appropriate payoffs that are quadratic functions of the stock payoff.
Consequently, it is not necessary to introduce a continuum of call and put options to complete the market. We next show that a derivative asset with a payoff of Q(u) = u 2 can complete the market, yielding the following result.
Theorem 3 Let P Qt denote the price of the quadratic derivative asset and D i Qt denote the demand for the quadratic derivative asset by investor i in trading session t. Then there exists a dynamic equilibrium in which
where K t is the same as in Theorem 1.
Like Theorem 2, this theorem also shows that investors with high confidence take short positions in options and investors with low confidence take long positions in options. Also, there will be trading volume in the underlying stock even if its price does not change. In oneperiod models, when markets are complete, there exists a representative investor who prices all assets according to his belief and marginal utility. 11 Interestingly, this result still holds in our dynamic trading model with differential interpretation of public signals, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When markets are completed by adding either a continuum of call and put options or a single quadratic option, there exists a representative investor with risk tolerance τ and belief N (µ t , K t −1 ), where
It is indeed quite striking that markets were effectively complete with the introduction of a single derivative, and as a result, the prices of all contingent claims behave as if there existed a representative investor. Trading in options and the underlying stock, however, is active among investors at all trading sessions due to differences of opinion among investors in every period.
We now apply the results obtained in Theorems 2 and 3 to perform various analyses associated with options.
Value of Options
For the comparison with the case without options, we determine the value of adding options to the market, which is given in the following lemma. Let EU i o (T ) denote the expected utility of investor i in an economy with options and T trading sessions.
Lemma 4
The certainty equivalent value of trading in the options market is given by
where EU i (T ) denotes investor i's expected utility in an economy without options and where x i j is given by
This lemma shows that introducing options enhances investors' perceived welfare. Intuitively, with differences of opinion about the volatility of the stock payoff, investors disagree on both the stock prices and its options prices. They all believe that there are gains to be made in trading both the stock and the options. Consequently, their perceived gains are higher with options than without options. Moreover, as trading becomes more frequent, that is, T → ∞, γ i o (T ) does not diminish to zero. Thus frequent trading cannot substitute for options trading, contrary to the results obtained in models with common priors [ e.g., Brennan and Cao (1996) ].
Open Interest and Trading Volume in Options
This subsection considers the open interest and trading volume in options. From equation (26), investors' open interest in options increases with the average precision of the signal n t .
If we interpret n t as the informativeness of a public signal, then investors' holdings in options increase with the informativeness of the signal. Let ∆D i CZt denote investor i's amount of trading for a call option with strike price Z, which, according to Theorem 2, is given by
Let the trading volume in options, V CE , be defined as half of the sum of the absolute trades. We have
Because the average of ρ i is one,
Equations (30) and (33) 12 The results for put options can be obtained similarly.
These results are intuitive. Because investors are risk averse, a more informative signal reduces investors' uncertainty about the stock payoff. Hence, they demand more options.
With a higher dispersion of beliefs, investors disagree on the volatility of the stock payoff more; equivalently, they disagree on the options prices more, the demands for options naturally increase.
In practice, a proxy for the dispersion of beliefs is the dispersion among financial analysts'
forecasts. To connect the trading volume in options with the dispersion among analysts' forecasts, recall that investor i's conditional expectation of the final payoff u at time t is given by
The difference between investor i's forecast and the consensus forecast is
When ρ i is close to one, as a first-order approximation, we have the dispersion of forecasts
Consequently, we have the following relation between the trading volume and the dispersion of forecasts:
which means that investors' trading volume in options is higher when there is a larger dispersion in investors' forecasts. This result is consistent in spirit with the empirical result of Buraschi and Jiltsov (2003) , who find that open interest and trading volume in the index options market increase with their index of difference in beliefs.
When public signal in trading session t is very informative or the average precision of the signal n t is very large, open interest should be very high. It is likely that earnings announcements, mergers and acquisitions, or spinoffs represent informative public events and open interest should be higher around the dates of these public events. High open interest also suggests that trading volume in options may be high around these dates. Indeed, assuming that public information is very informative at time τ t or n t is so large such that 
Stock Trading Volume in the Presence of Options
The literature has provided some empirical evidence that the introduction of options tends to increase the trading volume of the underlying stock. In this subsection, we apply our model to examine the effects of options on the trading volume of the underlying stock.
Following the results of Theorem 2, we have
The trading volume of the underlying stock is then given by
It is clear that the trading volume can be positive even if the stock price remains the same, that is, ∆P t = 0. The reason is that in the presence of options, investors trade in the stock to hedge options. Even if the stock price remains unchanged, there may still be a need to hedge options because option prices may change due to differences of opinion about public signals.
This result extends the result of Harris and Raviv (1993) , who obtain that in the absence of options, trading takes place only when the stock price changes. It also complements the result of Kandel and Pearson (1995) , thus offering an alternative explanation for their empirical finding that trading may occur even if the stock price remains the same.
To offer sharper empirical predictions, we next assume that the volatility of the stock price change is stationary across trading sessions for the average investor, that is, Var[∆P t ] = Var[∆P t+1 ] for all t. This serves as a sufficient condition for the result regarding the expected trading volume of the underlying stock given in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The introduction of options increases the expected trading volume of the underlying stock. Moreover, the expected trading volume is more sensitive both to the price changes of the stock and to the dispersion of forecasts among investors.
The results of this proposition are due to investors' hedging demands for options. For example, with options, a change in the stock price affects the properties of the options associated with the stock, which requires more hedging for options. As a result, the expected trading volume of the stock is more sensitive to stock price changes in the presence of options.
To test the implications of Proposition 6, we can take two approaches. The first approach is to conduct an event study to analyze the amount of trading volume before and after the introduction of options. The second approach is to perform a cross-sectional study to compare trading volume and its sensitivity to price changes and the dispersion of forecasts among investors between stocks with options and those without options.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of trading based on differences of opinion regarding public signals. Trading depends on how much weight an investor puts on the public signal when she updates her beliefs. If one puts more weight on the public signal than the average investor does, then one will trade as a trend chaser. If one puts less weight on the public signal, one trades as a contrarian. The paper provides new insights on stock trading. It is shown that trading volume in the stock is proportional to the dispersion of beliefs among investors, which may be proxied by the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. In the absence of options, trading may take place even when there are no differences of opinion about future public signals, as long as there is a disagreement in the past. As the number of trading sessions goes to infinity, investors' perceived gains increase and converge to a finite limit, but the Pareto optimal allocation cannot be achieved.
When options are added to the economy, the Pareto optimal allocation is restored.
This can be accomplished by either adding a continuum of call and put options or a single option with quadratic payoffs of the stock. As a result, all stocks are priced as if there existed a representative investor or as if all investors had the same interpretation of the public signal. Trading volumes, however, reflect the underlying differences of opinion among investors. More specifically, all option contracts in our model are priced in accordance with the martingale principle of Black and Scholes (1973) . Yet active trading still occurs with the arrival of public signals as investors continue to interpret them differently.
This study offers some unique empirical implications. We show that open interest and trading volumes in options are higher both around the dates of public announcements and for stocks that have higher differences of opinion. We also show that in the presence of options, trading volumes of the underlying stocks are not only higher but also more responsive to their price changes.
For tractability, we adopted some simplifying assumptions. For example, we considered an economy with only one stock. It would be interesting to extend the model to incorporate multiple stocks. In this case, introducing options on one stock may affect trading in other stocks that are correlated with that stock. It may also lead to the Kandel-Pearson (1995) result that when the price of a stock remains the same, trading in this stock can still occur around the dates of public announcements. Intuitively, the trading volume of one stock is related not only to the price changes of this stock but also to the price changes of other correlated stocks. Because differences of opinion may affect investors' consumption decisions, another generalization would be to consider an intertemporal consumption model with multiple consumption dates. To focus on trading based only on differences of opinion, we have ignored the effects of private information acquisition. It would be of interest to develop a general model that incorporates both differences of opinion and asymmetric information in the presence of options. Finally, in the presence of both risk-averse investors and options, the model becomes intractable with short-sale constraint on stocks and position limits on options. Taking portfolio constraints on stocks and options into account may provide additional insight on the dynamics of trading volume and price process and how they relate to the dispersion of beliefs among investors. We leave them for future research.
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove this theorem using mathematical induction. It is straightforward to show that the price function stated in the theorem clears the market; then we only need to show that the investors' demands are optimal.
In the last trading session, since there is only one trading session left, it is well known that investor i's trading strategy is as described in the theorem:
Given this equilibrium trading strategy, investor i's expected utility in the last trading session is then given by
s excess return at session (T − 1). The first term in the exponential comes from the investor's wealth, and the second term represents the certainty equivalent gains in the expected utility from trading in the last session.
Suppose that at trading session (t + 1), investor i's demand and expected utility are given by
and
respectively. If at session t, investor i's optimal trading strategy and expected utility are equal to
then the proposed equilibrium holds by induction.
At trading session t, let a t denote the price change, b i t denote the expected excess return for investor i, and W i t denote the wealth of investor i, that is,
To determine the optimal strategy of investor i at session t, we need to calculate the expected utility given any strategy
. This can be determined in two steps:
From equation (6), we have
which implies that
Thus we can rewrite a t+1 as a t+1 = A t+1 (u − P t + η t+1 ), where A t+1 is defined by
Define:
We now calculate the expected utility conditional on a t+1 ; dropping irrelevant terms, this is given by
Taking the expectation with respect to a t+1 , we get
Because Λ The first-order condition simplifies to:
which implies that investor i's optimal demand for the tth trading session is given by
The optimal demand in equation (51) has the same form as in equation (42) 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume that K i t−1 = K t−1 , n i t = n t , and n i j = n j for j > t. From investor i's demand function, we get
when ∆P t = 0. In addition for j > t, there is agreement on the public signals after session t, we have
Proof of Lemma 1:
We provide the proof for the economy with two trading sessions.
The proof for the general case is similar and is thus omitted.
Investor i's wealth at time 1 is given by
The wealth function, ignoring some irrelevant terms, is then given by
Taking the expectation with respect to u and η 1 , we have
Further algebra gives the results in the lemma for the two trading session case.
Proof of Proposition 2:
This proposition follows directly from equation (13).
Proof of Proposition 3: From equation (6), we have
where (u − ρ i P t ) is independent of P t . Similarly, we have
Proof of Lemma 2: Parts (i), (iv), and (v) follow immediately from investors' trades, price changes, and Proposition 2. Let ∆µ t ≡ µ t − µ t−1 , Part (ii) follows because
Part (iii) follows because E i [∆P t ] and Var i [∆P t ] are both increasing in n t and because V (µ, σ)
is increasing in µ and σ for positive µ and σ.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The volume is defined as
where V t = Qτ h|∆P t | is the trading volume at time τ t . Notice that
The expected volume at time τ t , E i [V t ], is obtained using an elementary property of the normal distribution:
where V (·, ·) is the expected absolute value of a normally distributed variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 and where
Notice that 1/K t represents the conditional variance of the average investor at time τ t . . which implies that
Proof of Theorem 2:
It is easy to check that the proposed equilibrium prices clear the proposed equilibrium demands. We only need to show that the proposed equilibrium demands are optimal given the prices. In the last trading session (T − 1), investor i's wealth in the next period is given by Given the conjectured demands and prices for the stock and options, we have
It can be shown that in this proposed equilibrium, investors achieve the Pareto optimal allocation and the Euler conditions for the stock and options are satisfied, that is, Thus the proposed equilibrium holds in the last period.
Suppose that the proposed equilibrium holds for period t. If we can show that the proposed demands and prices also constitute an equilibrium at trading session (t − 1), then the demands and prices form an equilibrium for all t. Let U i (W i t , P t ) denote the expected utility that investor i achieves conditional on his wealth and belief in trading session t. As in the proof of Theorem 3, it can be shown that
To prove that the proposed demands are optimal, we need to show that the following Euler conditions hold:
t−1 [(P t − P t−1 )U (W i t , P t )] = 0, E i t−1 [(P P Zt − P P Z(t−1) )U (W i t , P t )] = 0, where " ⇒ " means that a multiplier (a proportional factor) that is unrelated to y tk has been omitted. Consequently, the marginal rates of substitution are unrelated to i and are equal for all investors.
Because f i (y tk )U (W i t (y tk ), P t (y tk )) is independent of investor i's information, the Euler equations for all investors differ by only a multiplier. As a result, if the Euler conditions for one investor (e.g., the average investor) are satisfied, then the Euler equations for all other investors will be satisfied. Consequently, we only need to show that the Euler equations hold for the average investor who does not trade in the market.
Let a denote the average investor with ρ a = 1. Following Brennan (1979) , we have Thus, the Euler equations hold for investor a at session (t − 1), which further implies that the Euler equations hold for all investors. The proposed demands are optimal for all investors at session (t − 1). By mathematical induction, the proposed equilibrium demands are optimal in all periods.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We prove this theorem using mathematical induction. It is straightforward to show that the price function stated in the theorem clears the market; then we only need to show that the investors' demands are optimal.
In the last trading session, substituting investor i's terminal wealth into the utility function, using the conjectured equilibrium price of the option, and taking expectations, we can write investor i's portfolio problem as
Proof of Proposition 4:
Notice that the option price P Qt is independent of ρ i . Hence, even if ρ i = 1 for all investors, the option prices would remain the same. Because all state contingent claims can be synthesized using options, all option prices can be determined according to the average investor and thus all assets can be priced using the same principle.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proposition follows directly from equations (30) 
Because K t+1 ≥ n t+1 and K t ≥ h, we have that |∆D 
